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Journal of Health Politics, Policy and Law 2003 28(5):883-926; DOI:10.1215/03616878-28-5-883
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Duke University Press

Mandating Insurance Offers for Low-Wage Workers: An Evaluation of Labor Market Effects

Amy Wolaver
Bucknell University

Timothy McBride
University of Missouri–St. Louis

Barbara Wolfe
University of Wisconsin–Madison

Abstract.

Employing a simultaneous model of part-time status, health insurance offers, and wages, we examine the impacts on employment and health insurance coverage of nondiscrimination rules in the tax code governing employer-sponsored health insurance. Using 1988 and 1993 Employee Benefits Supplements to the Current Population Surveys and variations in health insurance premiums and minimum wages, we find that health insurance coverage among low-wage primary earners is increased by at most 31 percent by the policy, at a cost of an estimated 0.8–5.4-percentage-point decrease in full-time employment for low-wage workers.






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